Last edited by Mooguzil
Tuesday, July 28, 2020 | History

4 edition of Strategic trade policy with incompletly informed policymakers found in the catalog.

Strategic trade policy with incompletly informed policymakers

by S. Lael Brainard

  • 75 Want to read
  • 39 Currently reading

Published by Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English


Edition Notes

StatementS. Lael Brainard [and] David Martimort.
SeriesWP -- #3469-92, Working paper (Sloan School of Management) -- 3469.
ContributionsMartimort, David., Sloan School of Management.
The Physical Object
Pagination26, [2], 12 p. ;
Number of Pages26
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17938637M
OCLC/WorldCa45882228

Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers with S. Lael Brainard: w Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements are high, and unlikely to be met in practice. This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets. We show that (i) regardless of the nature of goods, choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for downstream firms, which leads downstream firms to face a prisoners' dilemma; (ii) the optimal export intervention can be a subsidy under Bertrand competition.

1 PUBLICATIONS IN SCHOLARLY JOURNALS * In English “Export Subsidy versus Export Quotas with Incompletely Informed Policy Makers”, forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review (with T. Kuroda). “Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls in an Open Economy”, forthcoming in International Economic Review (with K. Kiyono). "From Segmented Markets to Integrated Markets: An Analysis of Economic . Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers by Lael S. Brainard & David Martimort; Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships by Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort; Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency by David Martimort & Lars Stole.

Incompletely Informed Policymakers and Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Industries Manchester School, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. , June Number of pages: 15 Posted: 06 Jul STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WHAT MAKES A GOOD OR SECTOR STRATEGIC? Usual answers: [1] High value added per worker. But this is usually just a high K/L ratio. [2] Importance for defense, survival. This is better handled by subsidy, storage. [3] “Linkages” with other goods / sectors. But linkages are everywhere, and we expect markets to handle them.


Share this book
You might also like
Soviet refugees

Soviet refugees

Aquatic diptera

Aquatic diptera

Hazard and prospect

Hazard and prospect

Lakes spring wholesale trade list

Lakes spring wholesale trade list

Characteristics and uses of Montana fly ash

Characteristics and uses of Montana fly ash

Treatment protocols and algorithms for prehospital care

Treatment protocols and algorithms for prehospital care

Expert Resumes for Health Care Careers

Expert Resumes for Health Care Careers

Climb a lonely hill

Climb a lonely hill

Number dictionary

Number dictionary

Bees dance and whales sing

Bees dance and whales sing

Agriculture and ecology in Africa

Agriculture and ecology in Africa

Manitobas aboriginal populations projected, 1991-2016

Manitobas aboriginal populations projected, 1991-2016

The Politics of Scholarly Gentlemen

The Politics of Scholarly Gentlemen

Evaluating economic liberalization

Evaluating economic liberalization

Places of power

Places of power

The sacred bullock.

The sacred bullock.

Strategic trade policy with incompletly informed policymakers by S. Lael Brainard Download PDF EPUB FB2

Excerpt from Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers This paper analyses the implications of Strategic trade policy with incompletly informed policymakers book information for strategic trade policy. It revisits in an incomplete information context the simple but powerful point made by Brander and Spencer () that in an oligopolistic industry, unilateral government intervention can shift rents by providing a strategic Cited by: Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletly Informed Policymakers [Martimort, David, Brainard, S Lael, Sloan School of Management] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.

Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletly Informed PolicymakersAuthor: Lael S. Brainard, David Martimort. Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers S. Lael Brainard, David Martimort. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in May NBER Program(s):International Trade Cited by: Abstract: Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements are high, and unlikely to be met in practice.

This paper investigates the implications of incomplete information for a simple, rent-shifting trade policy of the type proposed in Brander-Spencer (). COVID Resources. Reliable information about the coronavirus (COVID) is available from the World Health Organization (current situation, international travel).Numerous and frequently-updated resource results are available from this ’s WebJunction has pulled together information and resources to assist library staff as they consider how to handle coronavirus.

Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers Abstract Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements.

We study strategic trade policy design when governments are incompletely informed about the market demand. Two symmetric, homogeneous product Cournot firms, one in each country, compete in a third country by: 6.

We study strategic trade policy design when governments are incompletely informed about the market demand. Two symmetric, homogeneous product. Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have been warning that the informational requirements are enormous, because the policy recommendations are highly sensitive to the particularities of the market, and are unlikely to be met in practice.1 This warning has been borne out in practice, as even attempts to evaluate the effects of trade policies in oligopolistic industries ex post have encountered severe informational Cited by: "Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol.

42(), pagesFebruary. Brainard, S.L. & Martimort, D., " Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers," PapersToulouse. f\ HDM dewey StrategicTradePolicy withIncompletelyInformedPolicymakers ainard*andDavidMartimort" September WorkingPaperNo MASSACHUSETTS.

Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements are high, and unlikely to be met in practice. This paper investigates the implications of incomplete information for a simple, rent-shifting trade policy of the type proposed in Brander-Spencer ().

Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers. Author links open overlay panel Brainard a David Martimort b c. Show more. We investigate the implications of incomplete information for a simple, rent-shifting trade policy á la Brander and Spencer (Journal of International Economics.

18, 83– Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers Abstract Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements are high, and unlikely to be met in : Lael S.

Brainard and David Martimort. Strategic trade policy with incompletly informed policymakers. By S. Lael. Brainard and David Martimort. Abstract "September First draft July Publisher: Cambridge, Mass.: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Year: OAI Author: S. Lael. Brainard and David Martimort. Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers Abstract Ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy, economists have warned that the informational requirements are high, and unlikely to be met in practice.

David Martimort is the author of The Theory of Incentives ( avg rating, 1 rating, 0 reviews), Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policy /5.

Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE) S. L., & Martimort, D. Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers. Google Scholar. Brander J.

A., & Spencer, B. Gandolfo G. () Appendix to Chapter In: International Trade Theory and Policy. Springer Texts in Business Author: Giancarlo Gandolfo.

Strategic trade policy has existed for nearly as long as international trade itself, with roots going back to ancient Greece.

In strategic trade policy, economic policymakers seek to help domestic firms compete with foreign firms by transferring profits from the foreign. Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers NBER Working Paper No. w Number of pages: 45 Posted: 25 Jul Last Revised: 16 Aug. Brainard, S.

L. and D. Martimort (), 'Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers', NBER Working Paper Cited by:   An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity/Concentration Tradeoff Between Multinational Sales and Trade.

S Lael Brainard. 02 Mar Paperback. US$ Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletly Informed Policymakers. David Martimort. 25 Aug Hardback. US$ Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers (Classic.Book reviews pp.

A. Author. Vol issueExporters, skill upgrading, and the wage gap pp. Andrew Bernard and J. Jensen Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers pp. S. Lael Brainard and David Martimort Political reform and trade policy pp.

Raymond Riezman and John Wilson.